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I. INTRODUCTION
Under basic economic principles, it is assumed that competition bene-
fits businesses and consumers alike. As a result, the thrust of the federal
antitrust laws is to protect competition. In order to provide adequate
enforcement of these laws, Congress has fashioned several mechanisms.
One of these mechanisms is private enforcement.
In the Sherman Act of 1890, this country's first federal antitrust statute,
Congress provided a private cause of action for treble damages and attor-
ney's fees to any person injured by an antitrust violation.' Senator Sher-
man himself stated, with unanimous agreement from the drafters,2 that
the enactment of section 7 was specifically intended to give a cause of
action to private individuals. 3 In 1914, Congress reenacted this provision
under section 4 of the Clayton Act,4 which remains the law today.
Under the federal antitrust enforcement scheme, there are four basic
goals that aim to ensure fairness and efficiency: (1) deterrence of anti-
trust violations;5 (2) compensation of those injured by antitrust viola-
tions;6 (3) avoidance of multiple liability for the same alleged antitrust
violation;7 and (4) identification and employment of manageable and in-
telligible judicial standards.8 Unfortunately, there are some inherent in-
consistencies among these four goals, and favoring one goal over another
may lead to adverse or unintended results. This Comment looks at
whether or not the Supreme Court's well-known decision in Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois9 has produced such an effect.
1. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(1994)).
2. S. REP. No. 239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979).
3. 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). See also 21 CONG. REC.
1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George).
4. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.$.C. § 15
(1987)). See 51 CONG. REc. 16,319 (1914) (statement of Rep. Floyd); id. at 15,938 (state-
ment of Sen. Nelson). The 1955 Congress repealed section 7 of the Sherman Act because it
was seen as superfluous. See S. REP. No. 239.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows private parties to recover treble damages for anti-
trust violations:
[Alny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States ... without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1987).
5. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 730-31 n.11.
8. See id. at 737, 741-42; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481, 492-93 (1968).
9. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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In particular, this Comment looks at how the Illinois Brick decision
influenced, and arguably weakened, the current antitrust enforcement
scheme in Texas. 10 Since federal law plays a large role in the Texas
scheme, it is appropriate to first conduct a brief historical review of the
legislative and judicial histories leading up to Illinois Brick. Subse-
quently, this Comment will analyze the Illinois Brick decision and the
effects of the Court's holdings on indirect purchaser suits. The analysis
will focus on the Congressional and State response to the controversial
Illinois Brick decision," with an economic discussion of some of the
problems and inconsistencies found in private antitrust enforcement.' 2
Finally, this Comment will discuss the current state of the Texas anti-
trust laws by looking at the history of antitrust enforcement in Texas and
how the Illinois Brick decision affected Texas's antitrust enforcement pol-
icies. Analysis and discussion will focus on reformation attempts, recent
case law, and whether Texas should enact a "Brick repealer" into its cur-
rent statutory scheme. 13
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS LEADING UP TO THE
ILLINOIS BRICK DECISION
A. THE ANTITRUST STANDING DILEMMA
For purposes of this Comment, it is important to differentiate between
"antitrust standing,"'14 which is the issue here, and the Constitutional doc-
trine of standing. The antitrust laws, like all other laws, are subject to the
Constitutional doctrine of standing, but the focus of "antitrust standing"
is somewhat different.' 5 While showing some redressable harm to a
10. Illinois Brick is highly relevant to Texas antitrust law because, as a general rule, the
Texas antitrust laws (the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act) are to "be construed in
harmony with the federal interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes." TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
11. As will be discussed, the states are free to fashion their own antitrust laws. This
includes the states' right to allow for indirect purchaser suits without federal preemption.
See infra part III.B.
12. Although there is not complete agreement on the subject, many believe that eco-
nomics play an important, if not predominant, role in modern antitrust analysis. "Antitrust
has gone through an economics revolution in the last two decades, and that revolution is
strongly reflected in the case law." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRUST 51 (2d ed. 1993).
13. The phrase "Brick repealer" has been used frequently to describe a state statute
that expressly allows for indirect purchaser suits under applicable state antitrust law. The
effect of such a provision is to "repeal" the force and effect that Illinois Brick would other-
wise have.
14. Under federal antitrust laws, many "persons," can sue for damages: corporations
(see 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1994)); partnerships (see Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952)); individuals (see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330 (1979)); states (see 15 U.S.C. § 15; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972));
and the United States (see 15 U.S.C. § 15a).
15. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983).
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plaintiff is usually enough to satisfy the Constitutional doctrine, 16 deter-
mining "antitrust standing" requires further inquiry as to whether the
plaintiff is the correct representative to bring the private antitrust
action. 17
To emphasize consumer protection under the antitrust laws, one would
prefer broad standing, but the potential flood of litigation renders a
broad standing preference unrealistic.' 8 The Supreme Court has prof-
fered its solution to this dilemma in a two-part test.' 9 The first prong of
the test asks if the plaintiff has suffered an antitrust injury,20 and the sec-
ond prong asks if the plaintiff is the most efficient enforcer of the anti-
trust laws.2' This test purports to solve the dilemma by balancing two
important aspects of antitrust enforcement: (1) encouraging private suits;
and (2) avoiding "overkill."
B. THE PASS-ON DEFENSE: HANOVER SHOE, INC. V. UNITED SHOE
MA CHINE CORP.
Prior to 1968, federal courts were faced with a recurring problem in
private antitrust enforcement-the "pass-on" defense. This defense was
often employed by antitrust defendants in price fixing suits. In a typical
situation, a manufacturer would be sued by a wholesaler (a "direct pur-
chaser") under section 4 of the Clayton Act for an alleged engagement in
a price fixing conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws.2 2 The defend-
ant manufacturer would respond by alleging that the wholesaler was not
injured because the wholesaler had only "passed on" the overcharge or
16. Note, however, that requirements for Constitutional standing have been increas-
ingly strict and impose a more formidable hurdle than they once did. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
17. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535 n.31.
18. The Supreme Court once gave its version of the standing dilemma as follows:
Of course, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of [sec-
tion] 4 offers any focused guidance on the question of which injuries are too
remote from the violation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the
predicate for a suit under [section] 4; indeed, the unrestrictive language of
the section, and the avowed breadth of the congressional purpose cautions us
not to cabin [section] 4 in ways that will defeat its broad remedial objective.
But the potency of the remedy implies the need for some care in its
application.
Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982).
19. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986).
20. Antitrust injury is determined by looking at the "physical and economic nexus
between the alleged violation and the harm to the plaintiff" and the "relationship of the
injury alleged with those forms of injury about which Congress was likely to have been
concerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy
under [section] 4 [of the Clayton Act]." Blue Shield of Va., 457 U.S. at 478.
21. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110 n.5.
22. For purposes of clarity, this Comment assumes a simplistic vertical arrangement of
parties: a manufacturer, a wholesaler or retailer, and an ultimate consumer. Throughout
this Comment, the manufacturer is generally the alleged price fixing conspirator or anti-
trust violator; the wholesaler or retailer, who buys directly from the manufacturer, is the




price increase 23 it had incurred to the next purchaser (i.e., an "indirect
purchaser").
The Supreme Court offered a solution to this problem with its pro-
enforcement decision, as it was labeled by consumer activists, of Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machine Corp.24 In Hanover Shoe, a shoe man-
ufacturing company sued a shoe machine manufacturer for treble dam-
ages under section 4 the Clayton Act. The plaintiff shoe manufacturer
alleged that the defendant had injured plaintiff's business by not allowing
plaintiff to purchase shoe manufacturing equipment and only offering the
equipment as leasable property.25 The defendant answered that the
plaintiff had not suffered any injury because plaintiff merely passed on
the increased costs of business to the next purchaser by raising its own
prices. This pass-on defense was usually sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's
cause of action.26
But in Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court effectively wiped out the
pass-on theory as a viable defense by reasoning that such a defense only
complicates treble-damages actions under Clayton section 4, thus lessen-
ing private enforcement. 27 In addition, the Court noted that a variety of
factors influence a direct purchaser's pricing policies and that separating
out the damages from a "pass-on" can sometimes be difficult or
impossible.28
The Hanover Shoe Court was also concerned that indirect purchasers,
those one or more transactions below the wholesaler, would have little
incentive to sue. Moreover, the Court agreed that the injury to the direct
purchaser was not based solely on the actual passed-on costs. The Court
held that a direct purchaser's recoupment of illegal overcharges is imma-
terial, because if a direct purchaser were not overcharged, it could keep
its resale prices lower and, in turn, make its business more profitable:
"At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller remains
illegally high, and his profits would be greater were his costs lower."'29
23. An overcharge or price increase is generally defined as "the difference between
the price that would have prevailed in a competitive market and the price that the plaintiff
was forced to pay as a result of the antitrust violation." HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at
293.
24. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
25. There was no real contest as to the illegality of the defendant's conduct, according
to the majority of the Court, since plaintiffs were riding on the heels of a successful crimi-
nal suit brought by the government. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 484. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a);
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 570-72 (1951) (holding that a
successful government prosecution is prima facie evidence in subsequent private actions).
26. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 490 n.8 (citing Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260
U.S. 156 (1922); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
915 (1955); Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Twin Ports
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941)).
27. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 489. "The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not
to go beyond the first step.... [One's] claim accrue[s] in the theory of the law and it does




The Court concluded it was imperative that the pass-on defense be de-
nied, because if the direct purchaser were barred from recovery and the
indirect purchaser had no incentive to sue, manufacturers would "retain
the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring
suit against them."'30
The response to the Hanover Shoe decision was mixed. For plaintiffs,
the decision was quite favorable because its results were very pro-con-
sumer and pro-enforcement. Defendants, on the other hand, viewed the
decision as patently unfair, arguing that disallowing such a defense would
subject them to multiple recoveries by direct and indirect purchasers.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seemed to approve of the idea that it
was best to err in favor of the consumer, at least until it handed down
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois31 a decade later.
C. THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO AcT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
PARENS PATRIAE CAUSE OF ACTION
The consumer victory in Hanover Shoe was short lived. After Hanover
Shoe, federal courts continued to institute many prerequisites to private
actions which rendered once effective procedural devices, like class ac-
tions, either inefficient or unavailable. 32 In addition to high prelitigation
expenses, the high cost of suit management, notice requirements, and at-
torney's fees made the class action a virtually worthless enforcement
vehicle. 33
Although the problems and deficiencies with private enforcement vehi-
cles were hotly contested among experts in the field,34 these issues
needed to be resolved if consumer protection was to remain valued in the
United States. In the mid-1970s, Congress decided to review this appar-
ent deterioration of private enforcement. The Congressional response
was an expansion of antitrust standing via the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-
trust Improvements Act of 1976 ("Hart-Scott-Rodino Act"). 35
Although the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act added no new substantive liabil-
ity, it specifically provided a parens patriae cause of action for attorneys
general to bring suit on behalf of their injured constituents. 36 When en-
acting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Congress understood Hanover Shoe to
be a pro-enforcement decision and believed that only defendants would
be prohibited from using a pass-on theory. Moreover, Representative
Rodino clearly assumed that plaintiffs would not be subject to the corol-
30. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
31. See infra part II.D.
32. See Cynthia U. Kassis, Comment, The Indirect Purchaser's Right to Sue Under Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act: Another Congressional Response to Illinois Brick, 32 AM. U. L.
REV. 1087, 1096-97 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (holding that Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires individual notice to all identifiable
members of the class, no matter how expensive).
34. See infra part IV.
35. 90 Stat. 1394-96 (current version at 15 U.S.C §§ 15c-15g).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15g.
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lary of the rule proffered in Hanover Shoe.37
This curative response by Congress was stripped of its intended power
by subsequent judicial opinions which focused on the fact that no new
substantive liability was created by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Under
this analysis, courts could force an attorney general to show the requisite
antitrust injury or standing of his constituents before damages actions
could be instigated.38
Furthermore, in 1977, the Supreme Court handed down Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, which arguably disregarded the legislative history of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and removed the consumer's ability, as an indi-
rect purchaser, to privately enforce the antitrust laws.39 The Illinois Brick
decision was controversial because it seemed to weaken the concept of
consumer protection, which was historically viewed as the dominant pur-
pose of the antitrust laws.40
D. THE PASS-ON OFFENSE: ILLINOIS BRICK Co. V. ILLINOIS
Indirect purchasers often have trouble showing antitrust injury when
dealing with a manufacturer's price fixing conspiracy as they are several
levels removed from the antitrust violation. One way to resolve this
problem (and to show antitrust injury) is to allege that the wholesaler, or
some other middleman, has passed on the manufacturer's increased
prices to the next consumer (i.e., the indirect purchaser). This is the co-
rollary of the pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe; this is the offensive ver-
sion of the pass-on theory. Realistically, it is often the indirect purchaser
who bears most, or at least some, of the passed-on costs from an illegal
overcharge.41 Therefore, allowing an indirect purchaser to employ a
pass-on offense to gain antitrust standing seems appropriate. For the dec-
ade following Hanover Shoe, use of this offensive tactic generally went
unabated.
37. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735 n.14. The corollary of the pass-on defense is the
pass-on offense. The pass-on offense is where an indirect purchaser claims antitrust injury
as a result of the direct purchaser's pass-on of the manufacturer's increase in prices. See
infra part II.D.
38. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735 n.14. After the Illinois Brick decision eliminated
indirect purchaser standing, the Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., held
that the consumers for which the parens patriae cause of action is brought must have the
requisite antitrust injuries. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 219 (1990). This
arguably rendered the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ineffective because the State, under parens
patriae, has no greater right to recovery than the consumers it represents.
39. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735 n.14.
40. The general purpose of the private treble-damages cause of action is to compen-
sate those injured by the violation, penalize the wrongdoer, and deter future violations by
such punishment. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746. See also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977); Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489. The Illinois
Brick Court itself stated that the underlying legislative purpose of the Clayton Act is to
create a "group of 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws under [Clayton
section] 4." Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
262 (1972)).
41. See infra part IV.C.
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In the mid-1970s the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) inves-
tigated a matter concerning an alleged price fixing conspiracy among nu-
merous concrete block manufacturers in the State of Illinois.42
Allegations surfaced that the block manufacturers had engaged in various
antitrust violations that were subject to criminal penalties. After an in-
depth investigation by the DOJ, a federal grand jury returned numerous
indictments and eleven defendants subsequently plead no contest and
paid criminal fines totaling approximately $20,000.00.
While the DOJ investigation was progressing, the State of Illinois's
own civil investigation team discovered that many of its public building
and construction projects had been overcharged by some three million
dollars by the same group of defendants. The State of Illinois, along with
over 700 state and local agencies, brought suit against the block manufac-
turers intending to prove that the block manufacturers had overcharged
the State's project contractors millions of dollars which were ultimately
passed on to the State. This complaint is a classic example of the offen-
sive pass-on theory.
The Seventh Circuit unanimously held that the State had the requisite
antitrust injury and standing even though the State had purchased the
concrete blocks indirectly from the manufacturers through middlemen
such as subcontractors and builders.43 But the Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court's decision and held, for the first time in the history of
the federal antitrust laws, that the pass-on theory could not be used Offen-
sively by an indirect purchaser.44
The Court offered several reasons in support of its holdings. First, the
Court sided with the defendants' argument that it was patently unfair to
disallow the use of defensive pass-on theories while allowing offensive
pass-on. The Court decided, in the interest of equity, that the rule for
pass-on theories used in Clayton section 4 claims needed to be applied
equally to both plaintiffs and defendants.45
Second, the Court sympathized with the defendants' fears that allowing
offensive pass-on would subject defendant manufacturers to multiple lia-
bility. The majority of the Justices were concerned with the possibility
that such defendants could face suits from the direct purchaser and indi-
rect purchasers for the same alleged illegalities.46
Finally, the Court expressed great concern with evidentiary difficulties
inherent in a pass-on theory.47 The Court was skeptical about the judici-
42. Historical fact pattern taken from Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163
(1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
43. Ampress Brick, 536 F.2d at 1163. This was a reversal of the district court's ruling
that granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant block manufacturers.
44. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 730.
47. Id. at 740. "[A]llowing indirect purchasers to recover using pass-on theories ...
would transform treble-damages actions into massive multiparty litigation involving many




ary's ability to analyze the pricing and output data and tracing the price
increases to subsequent injuries. The majority felt that keeping the suits
simple and allowing direct purchasers to collect full amounts of treble
damages would increase antitrust enforcement by avoiding the "weighing
down [of] treble-damages actions with the 'massive evidence and compli-
cated theories." '48
The Illinois Brick rule does, however, lend itself to some exceptions.
The Court held that preexisting cost-plus contracts could provide an ex-
ception to the rule because the pass-on in this type of situation is absolute
and thus the effect of the overcharge is determined in advance. 49 An-
other important exception carved out by the Court involves situations
where a direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer or where
a middleman is a co-conspirator.5 0 Other exceptions, developed after Illi-
nois Brick, exist when the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by the
seller,51 when the direct purchaser is a co-conspirator with the supplier in
a vertical price fixing agreement,5 2 or for an injunction suit under Clayton
section 16.53
III. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ILLINOIS BRICK DECISION
A. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
The Congressional response to the Illinois Brick decision was, for the
most part, immediate, loud, and critical. Congress expressed concern that
antitrust enforcement had been severely weakened, that the Illinois Brick
decision was retreating from aggressive enforcement, and that the deci-
48. Id. at 741 (citing Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493). Compare the Illinois Brick
Court's concern regarding a court's calculation of damages with the holding in Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946). In Bigelow, the Court held that an antitrust
defendant could not object to a plaintiffs reasonable and supported estimate of damages
when the wrongdoer's misconduct rendered a more precise calculation unavailable. Bige-
low, 327 U.S. at 265.
Any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at
the expense of his victim. It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so
effective and complete in every case as to preclude any recovery, by render-
ing the measure of damages uncertain. Failure to apply it [the rule] would
mean that the more grievous the wrong done, the less likelihood there would
be of a recovery.
Id. at 264-65. See also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 565-66 (1931) ("The constant tendency of the courts is to find some way in which
damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done."). Can these two previous hold-
ings be squared with the Illinois Brick Court's concern about the judiciary's ability to com-
pute damages?
49. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
50. Id.
51. See Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980); Mid-
West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
52. See, e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir.
1980); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
905 (1980) (requiring co-conspiring middleman to be a named defendant).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 26. An indirect purchaser is allowed to maintain an injunction suit
because the problems of computing damages are eliminated in assessing injunctive relief
and the statute does not require that plaintiff prove actual damages. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969).
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sion would deny important groups (such as the states) access to treble
damages provided for under the federal antitrust laws:
Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe create the unsatisfactory result of
denying any recovery to many truly injured persons, while granting
the exclusive right to sue to the middleman who, in many cases, will
either sue and obtain windfall gains or not sue and thereby allow
some defendants to retain the fruits of their antitrust violations.54
As a result, there was an immediate flurry of House and Senate pro-
posals to overturn or to limit Illinois Brick.55 This flurry eventually
turned long-term as Congressional hearings on similar proposals contin-
ued for ten years after the decision.56 In the end, Congress failed to pass
any law, and the Illinois Brick override effort ultimately failed at the fed-
eral level. This inability to change the law was largely due to support
from business groups and from strong evidence, mostly in the form of
economic data and analyses, supporting the theory that repealing Illinois
Brick would seriously undermine antitrust enforcement rather than im-
prove it.57
B. STATE REACTIONS
Fortunately, this was not the end of the debate surrounding Illinois
Brick since states are free to fashion their own antitrust laws. States can
specifically provide for indirect purchaser suits, in direct opposition to the
holding of Illinois Brick, because "Congress intended the federal antitrust
laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies. ' '58 Since the
54. Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 8359 Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1977) (statement of Professor Areeda).
55. The House of Representatives alone proposed six bills in two months to overturn
the Illinois Brick decision. See Jerry L. Beane, Passing-On Revived: An Antitrust Di-
lemma, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 347, 362 (1980).
56. Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings to Consider S. 300 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979); Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of
1979: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Restoring Effec-
tive Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2060, H.R. 2204 & Other Propos-
als Before the Subcomm. on the Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Taxpayer Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1983
(Illinois Brick): Hearings on S. 915 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. (1983-84); Antitrust Fairness Amendments of 1983 and Oversight of Corpo-
rate Interlocks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); The Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1986 (Illinois Brick): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
57. Evidence presented by Landes and Posner in The Antitrust Enforcement Act of
1979: Hearings to Consider S. 300 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1979) and The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on 5. 1468
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
58. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989). State antitrust laws are
not preempted by federal antitrust laws since issues in front of the Court in Illinois Brick
and Hanover Shoe were strictly issues of statutory interpretation of section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act. Id. at 100-03 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
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federal law seemed unlikely to change, many states decided to consider
the issue of indirect purchaser standing in their own legislatures.
Because many critics perceived the Illinois Brick decision as one of
anti-enforcement, and because only two states had indirect purchaser
statutes prior to Illinois Brick,59 fourteen states and the District of Co-
lumbia responded by altering the substantive provisions of their antitrust
laws to include "Illinois Brick repealers." 60 In addition to the sixteen
states that now expressly allow indirect purchaser standing, eighteen
states have statutes in place that could fairly be interpreted to include
indirect purchaser standing.61 But nine other states' interpretations of
private antitrust enforcement are in harmony with federal judicial inter-
pretations and federal antitrust laws.62
IV. PROBLEMS WITH INDIRECT PURCHASER SUITS:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST LAW
Economic analysis has played a large role in the debate on antitrust
laws. Some theorists suggest that a hands-off, laissez-faire approach to
antitrust law is the best solution, relying on factors of economic competi-
tion to provide sufficient enforcement of noncompetitive behavior.
63
Others, however, suggest that heavy regulation and enforcement provides
better deterrence, fairer business practices, and improved competition,
which will ultimately benefit the consumer.64 The following sections
present some examples of the economic debates and concerns surround-
ing indirect purchaser suits, like the one in Illinois Brick.
59. ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1977); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 75-21-9 (1973). Note that
neither statute allows for treble damages; the statutes allow for only actual damages plus
$500.00.
60. This survey of states is current as of 1990. See ARC America Task Force, Report
of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the
Supreme Court's Decision in California v. ARC American Corp., 59 ANITRusT L.J. 273
app. at 305-13 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force Report], for a complete and detailed descrip-
tion of these statutes.
61. See id.
62. See id. (Texas is included in this group).
63. This viewpoint is often referred to as the Chicago school of thought, named after
the University of Chicago professors that support it. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust
Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1979).
64. This viewpoint is often referred to as the Harvard school of thought, named after
the Harvard University professors that support it. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH L. REv. 213 (1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-
Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1717 (1990) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Anti-
trust's Protected Classes, 88 MIc-. L. REv. 1 (1989).
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B. PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
The efficacy of private enforcement is often debated due to its inherent
deficiencies. Antitrust injuries affect millions, but each individual's share
is very small.65 Therefore, it is commonly thought that there is little in-
centive or expectation for consumers, as indirect purchasers, to bring
suit.66 In addition, it is usually more difficult for an indirect purchaser to
detect antitrust violations, thus making him a less efficient enforcer of the
antitrust laws than perhaps a direct purchaser.67 Finally, the increased
litigation costs to manufacturers will likely result in higher prices to the
ultimate consumer.68
C. COMPLEXITY IN TRACING PRICING PATTERNS AND PASSING
OF COSTS
One of the major influences on the Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
Courts was the problem of calculating and tracing passed-on costs. The
Hanover Shoe Court held that calculating the subsequent price increase
from an illegal overcharge was too complex to allow the pass-on de-
fense. 69 Similarly, the Illinois Brick Court said that tracing the distribu-
tion of the illegal overcharge to show injury and damage apportionment
was too complex to allow the pass-on offense. 70 The common concern
was that courts would not be able to adequately interpret the complex
information involved in an indirect purchaser suit.
Generally, one could side with the Illinois Brick Court and, because of
the complexity of these suits, allow only direct purchasers to recover
damages. Alternatively, one could argue that the calculation of a direct
purchaser's damages are no more complex or unmanageable than those
of an indirect purchaser.71 Whichever side is argued, the basic problem
that remains unaddressed is that businesses are likely to pass on most, or
65. Approximately ten years ago, one commentator estimated that the gross amounts
that might be awarded per consumer were likely to be less than two dollars per year.
George J. Benston, Indirect Purchasers' Standing to Claim Damages in Price Fixing Anti-
trust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick Rule, 55
ANTITRusT L.J. 213, 246 (1986).
66. See Comment, Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions for Treble Damages, 14 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 328, 329-30 (1977). The accuracy of this premise is questionable. While the
House and Senate were considering S. 1874 and H.R. 8359 just months after the Illinois
Brick decision came down, Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield testified before
the Rodino Subcommittee (chaired by Representative Peter Rodino) that the United
States had over $200 million at stake in pending litigation, with an approximated 95% of
the damages flowing from indirect purchases. See Letter from C. Raymond Marvin, Wash-
ington Counsel, National Association of Attorneys General, to Max Frankel, Editorial Page
Editor, The New York Times (Oct. 19, 1977) (on file with the SMU Law Review).
67. See infra part IV.D.
68. See Southern Pac. Co., 245 U.S. at 534 ("Probably in the end the public pays the
damages in most cases of compensated torts.").
69. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493.
70. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 740-41.
71. Id. at 752 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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at least some, of their overcharges to the ultimate consumer.72 This
means, as has been argued by one of the leading economic commentators,
that the direct purchaser will recover, rather than absorb, most of its ille-
gal overcharge.73
As mentioned in the opening of this Comment,74 the four basic goals of
antitrust enforcement are potentially inconsistent. In the federal scheme,
the goal of using manageable judicial standards has taken precedence
over the goals of compensating parties for their injuries and deterring
antitrust violations. Although judicial complexity is a legitimate concern,
it is questionable whether this issue should prime other antitrust enforce-
ment goals. One should also question the Illinois Brick Court's skepti-
cism of the judiciary's ability to calculate damages. Arguably, the Illinois
Brick decision departs substantially from previous Supreme Court inter-
pretations on the calculations of damages in antitrust suits. Prior to the
lack of confidence displayed in the Illinois Brick opinion, juries were "al-
lowed to act on probable and inferential as well as direct and positive
proof" when dealing with the calculation of damages.75 Why did the
Supreme Court retreat from its previously held confidence in the lower
courts? Since damages in antitrust actions are conceedingly difficult to
prove, the degree of proof is lessened in such cases. 76
D. DETERRENCE VS. COMPENSATION
The federal antitrust enforcement scheme primarily seeks to deter
wrongdoers from repeating their anticompetitive acts and to compensate
those injured by such actions. 77 These two objectives appear to go hand
in hand, but placing emphasis on one goal over the other often leads to
quite different outcomes.
Many commentators would agree that deterrence is far more important
than compensation, because, "from a deterrence standpoint, it is irrele-
vant to whom damages are paid so long as someone redresses the viola-
tion."'78 Ideally, efficient deterrence balances two objectives: (1) keeping
72. Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, supra note 64, at
1726. This theory does not deny the fact that these cost-passing businesses will be injured
by the subsequent loss of sales due to the increased price. This loss of sales injury was a
basis for disallowing the pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe. Hanover Shoe, 392 US. at 489.
73. Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, supra note 64, at
1726-27. Professor Hovenkamp bases his argument upon the assumptions that the direct
purchaser is competitive and subject to constant scale returns.
74. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
75. Story Parchment Co., 282 U.S. at 564. See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co. 273 U.S. 359, 377-79 (1927).
76. See Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265 (1946).
77. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977).
78. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Note that the majority in
Illinois Brick agreed with this premise. Id at 746. See also Gregory J. Werden & Marius
Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations-An Economic Analysis,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 638 (1984). Landes and Posner explain why deterrence is more
important than compensations for antitrust enforcement: "If most antitrust violations were
deterred, the occasions for compensation would be few. The converse is not true: Even if
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costs of deterrence to a minimum while (2) punishing as many violators
as possible. The question that remains unanswered, however, is who is
better suited to deter violations, the direct purchaser or the indirect
purchaser?
To be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws one should also be an
efficient detector of violations. 79 Generally, the direct purchaser is in a
better position to detect price fixing violations due to intimate contacts
with its supplier and sensitivity to price increases. But one should be
hesitant to infer that because the probability of detection is greater, de-
terrence will follow. It is also likely that deterrence costs will be less
when enforcement is conducted by direct purchasers, 80 but direct pur-
chasers are less likely to bring an antitrust suit against a supplier than an
indirect purchaser.81 Thus, we are forced to choose between the direct
purchaser, an efficient detector who is not likely to bring an enforcement
action, and the indirect purchaser, a less efficient detector who is more
likely to bring suit individually, as a class representative, or via a parens
patriae cause of action.
E. THE POTENTIAL FOR MULTIPLE RECOVERIES
The Illinois Brick Court expressed a concern that allowing indirect pur-
chaser standing might result in multiple recoveries against price fixing de-
fendants.82 In addition, the Court noted its distrust in procedural devices
for providing appropriate protection and disagreed with the premise that
the risk of excess recovery should fall on the shoulders of the
wrongdoers. 83
Arguably, the current procedural rules can prevent multiple recovery,
or appropriate modifications can be made. 84 Furthermore, there has
been some debate as to whether a treble-damages reward actually results
the victims of antitrust violations were fully reimbursed, the social inefficiencies of the
violations would persist." Landes & Posner, supra note 63, at 605. Note, however, that
rules such as the one in Illinois Brick arguably do not affect deterrence because they only
affect the form of compensation, not the amount. Id. at 606. But see Robert G. Harris &
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Response to Landes and
Posner, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1280, 1281-86 (1980).
79. Werden & Schwartz, supra note 78, at 650.
80. Id. Note that Werden and Schwartz argue only that deterrence is less costly when
enforcement is left to the direct purchaser, not that enforcement actions are more likely to
occur. Id. This argument is based upon the premise that the suit will consist of a large
number of plaintiffs and that indirect purchasers in general have high interdependence
levels, meaning that the efforts of each potential plaintiff to detect violations are reduced
by reliance or expectation that others will detect the violation and bring enforcement. Id.
at 663. This view arguably ignores prosecution by a state attorney general via a parens
patriae cause of action.
81. See infra part IV.F.
82. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-31.
83. Id. at 731.
84. See Task Force Report, supra note 60, at 292-304 (detailing how to create a federal
antitrust claim for indirect purchasers by uniform statutes or procedural amendments).
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in three-fold damages to the plaintiff.85 These are important considera-
tions because much of the policy analysis behind restrictions on antitrust
standing, as in Illinois Brick, is based upon the assumption that current
damages are in fact three-fold. 86 If this is indeed an accurate assessment
of available damages, one should question the need for such restrictive
policy in private enforcement.
F. DIRECT PURCHASERS BRINGING SUIT
Lastly, one of the major concerns surrounding indirect purchaser suits
is whether direct purchasers are likely to bring enforcement actions. If
direct purchasers refuse to bring suit, and indirect purchasers are prohib-
ited from doing so, antitrust violations will go unpunished.8 7
There are many reasons why a direct purchaser would choose not to
bring an antitrust suit against its supplier. First, there is little incentive for
a direct purchaser to sue its supplier if the price overcharge can be passed
on to the next purchaser. 88 Second, as long as the direct purchaser is in a
good relationship with its supplier, the direct purchaser has little incen-
tive to jeopardize an important, and sometimes vital, supply relationship
by bringing a lawsuit.89 Finally, there also may be a disincentive to sue
when the direct purchasers themselves are receiving benefits from an
ongoing price fixing conspiracy or are controlled by the supplier.90
Assuming, that these obstacles can be overcome and a direct purchaser
does in fact sue its supplier, does the direct purchaser's subsequent recov-
ery represent compensation for its damages or does it represent a com-
plete windfall? As discussed above, an overcharge, illegal or not, is
generally passed on to an indirect purchaser by the direct purchaser.91
As a result, the direct purchaser will not suffer an injury to the extent the
overcharge is passed on. Yet the law, under Illinois Brick, allows the di-
rect purchaser to recover all damages resulting from the price increase,
regardless of what was recouped by the overcharge. Therefore, in an an-
85. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1993). Professor Lande provides a cautious, yet fully supported, argu-
ment that consumer plaintiffs who recover treble damages actually only recover 90% of
their losses, approximating single damages at best. Id. at 164-65. Lande also provides
evidence to show that defendants subject to treble-damages awards will usually only pay
107% of the attempted gains as opposed to the 300% contemplated by a treble-damages
provision. Id. at 169.
86. Id. at 172. Lande argues that because treble damages really turn out to be single
damages, Illinois Brick repealers make more sense. If these repealers lead to double re-
covery, then the congressional intent of the treble-damages provision, deterrence and com-
pensation, would be more realistically fulfilled. Id. at 173.
87. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Note also that a weaken-
ing of a plaintiffs legal remedies generally results in more illegal acts, but not in more suits.
Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation,
74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1019-20 (1986).
88. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Kassis, supra note 32, at 1108-09.
90. Id. at 1101, 1108-09.
91. See supra part IV.C.
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titrust action a treble-damages award to a direct purchaser is most likely a
complete windfall.
While the direct purchaser receives this windfall, which is arguably
much more than treble damages of his sustained injury,9 the indirect pur-
chasers and ultimate consumers will not receive anything. It may be eas-
ier for the courts to avoid complex economic theories in apportioning
damages, but is it fair to over reward one injured party while other in-
jured parties receive absolutely nothing?
V. THE TEXAS ANTITRUST LAWS
A. THE TEXAS FREE ENTERPRISE AND ANTITRUST Acr
Texas, once a pioneer of antitrust enforcement, was one of the first
states in the union to enact its own antitrust laws.93 In 1983, Texas en-
acted its modern antitrust scheme as the Texas Free Enterprise and Anti-
trust Act ("Texas Antitrust Act" or "Texas Act").94 The general purpose
of the 1983 reenactment was to modernize the rarely used or enforced,
century-old antitrust laws.95 To consumers, the Texas Act was seen as
promising because it added a treble-damages and attorney's fee provision
and seemed to allow a parens patriae cause of action. 96
After the 1983 reenactment, many questions remained unanswered as
to how Texas courts would construe certain provisions of the Act. Not
unlike any other newly enacted statutory scheme, it would take years for
these issues to work their way up through the courts for judicial com-
ment. Therefore, the sole beacon was the general guiding principle found
in section 15.04 of the Act.97
Section 15.04 states that the purpose of the Texas Act is to "maintain
and promote economic competition in trade and commerce occurring
wholly or partly within the State of Texas and to provide the benefits of
that competition to consumers in the state."'98 With this purpose in mind,
section 15.04 provides that the Texas Act "shall be construed to accom-
plish [the above] purpose and shall be construed in harmony with federal
judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes to the ex-
tent consistent with [the above] purpose." 99
92. The plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 15 says that an injured plaintiff is entitled to
receive "three-fold the damages" of the antitrust injury "by him sustained." 15 U.S.C.§ 15.
93. Antitrust Acts of May 25, 1899, 26th Leg., p. 246, c. 146, and March 31, 1903, Acts
1903, 28th Leg. p. 119, c. 94.
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.26 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
95. David J. VanSusteren, Note, The Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act-Analy-
sis and Implications, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (1985).
96. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.20-.24; VanSusteren, supra note 94, at 1182,
1220.
97. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04.
98. Id.
99. Id. See also Caller-Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications Inc., 826
S.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Tex. 1992). Although the Texas Antitrust Act is seen as mirroring
federal antitrust law, there is an important distinction between section 4 of the Clayton Act
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The important caveat in the general purpose, as stated in section 15.04,
is that federal interpretations are to be followed only to the extent that
they are consistent with the goal of protecting competition and consum-
ers in Texas. 1°° Thus, the Texas Act provides a general rule to follow
federal interpretations, but does not mandate absolute incorporation.' 0 '
In light of the Illinois Brick decision, this section of the Texas Act cre-
ates a special dilemma. To conform with the constructional mandate of
section 15.04, Texas courts seem obligated to follow the Illinois Brick de-
cision and not allow indirect purchaser standing. But this is to be done
only to the extent that Illinois Brick is seen as promoting "economic com-
petition" in Texas and to the extent that it provides Texas consumers with
the "benefits of that competition."'01 2 Therefore, the real focus should
not be on whether Texas should follow Illinois Brick because it is a fed-
eral decision, but rather on what effects Illinois Brick has on the Texas
economy and its consumers.
B. AVOIDING ]LLINOIS BRICK UNDER THE TEXAS Acr
The Texas Antitrust Act can be read to not include the bar on indirect
purchaser suits set forth in Illinois Brick. First of all, the Texas Act ex-
pressly defines an injured plaintiff under the Act as "any person ...
whose business or property has been injured" by unlawful conduct.10 3
Note that on its face the Act provides a remedy to all "injured" persons
and does not distinguish between direct and indirect purchasers. °4
Second, the Hanover Shoe decision and the doctrine of stare decisis
severely restricted the Illinois Brick Court in making its decision. 0 5 The
Texas judiciary, however, is free to disregard this reliance on stare deci-
and section 15.21(a) of the Texas Antitrust Act. The Texas provision requires a finding
that the defendant's conduct was "willful" or "flagrant" to recover treble damages and
attorney's fees, while the comparable federal provision does not require such a finding.
100. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04.
101. See, e.g., Caller-Times Publishing Co., 826 S.W.2d at 580-81 (supporting this analy-
sis by declining to follow any particular circuit). "Moreover, even where there is agree-
ment at the federal level, our state courts can under section 15.04 reject precedent which
fails to comport with the purpose of the state act." Jerry R. Selinger, Sherman Marches on
Austin: Some Comments About the New Antitrust Act, 47 TEX. Bus. J. 56, 60 (1984).
102. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04.
103. Id. § 15.21(a).
104. Since Texas antitrust law is to be harmonized with federal judicial interpretation, it
is important to note how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Texas Act's counterpart,
section 4 of the Clayton Act: "The lack of restrictive language in [section] 4 reflects Con-
gress'[s] expansive remedial purpose of creating a private enforcement mechanism to deter
violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and to provide ample com-
pensation to the victims of antitrust violations." Blue Shield of VaL, 457 U.S. at 472. As we
have recognized, "[t]he statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchas-
ers, or to competitors, or to sellers.... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated." Id. at 472.
105. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 ("[Wle must overrule [Hanover Shoe]... or we must
preclude respondents from seeking to recover on their pass-on theory.").
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sis' °6 and allow indirect purchaser standing based on a plain language
interpretation of and the policy considerations set forth in the Texas Act.
One could argue, for example, that Illinois Brick "is a United States
Supreme Court decision construing federal antitrust law, with a holding
that runs counter to the clearly expressed consumer purpose of the Texas
Antitrust Act.' 10 7
Third, if the purpose of the Act is to protect competition and provide
the benefits of competition to the consumer, then it seems mandatory
that indirect purchasers have recovery rights because they are "consum-
ers" as contemplated by the Texas Act.108 The Illinois Brick decision ar-
guably thwarts consumer protection under the Texas Act while providing
no indication as to how competition and the consumer are benefited by
its force.
C. DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE TEXAS ACT
Arguments can also be made to show that the holding in Illinois Brick
is actually in direct conflict with the Texas Antitrust Act.10 9 When apply-
ing the Illinois Brick decision to the Texas Act, one must keep in mind
that Illinois Brick was decided in light of the Hanover Shoe decision." 0
But upon careful examination of the Texas Act, it is quite possible that
Texas law does not even condone the holding in Hanover Shoe.
Section 15.21 of the Texas Act allows a plaintiff to recover only the
"actual damages sustained" in an antitrust suit. 1 Since the Texas Act
does not define the term "actual damages," the common law meaning of
106. Question whether the Illinois Brick Court's purported reliance on stare decisis is
well supported. First, indirect purchasers were allowed to sue until 1977, when the Court
handed down Illinois Brick. Second, the Illinois Brick rule is the corollary of the rule set
forth in Hanover Shoe, with arguably different effects. Finally, if the doctrine of stare deci-
sis is really being followed, how does one explain the significant departure from other
Supreme Court decisions with pro-consumer holdings: "The most elementary conceptions
of justice and public policy require that the [antitrust] wrongdoer shall bear the risk of
uncertainty which his own wrong has created." Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265 ("uncertainty"
refering to the inability to precisely calculate damages due to the defendant's antitrust
violations).
107. Brief of the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 20,
Segura v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 873 S.W.2d 399 (1994) (No. 03-93-00319-CV), affd, 907
S.W.2d 503 (1995) (emphasis in original).
108. Interestingly, the Texas Act does not define "consumers." Consumers are gener-
ally defined as the "users of the final product." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 316 (6th ed.
1990). "Consumers are to be distinguished from manufacturers (who produce goods), and
wholesalers or retailers (who sell goods)." Id. (parentheses in original). Borrowing from
other Texas statutes, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act(DTPA) defines a consumer to be "an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a
subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or
services .... TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
109. Arguments and support herein taken from Brief of the State of Texas at 21-22,
Segura (No. 03-93-00319-CV).
110. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728-29.
111. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21.
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the phrase must be employed.112 Inherent in the Texas common law
analysis is the "one satisfaction" rule, which limits the recovery of dam-
ages to those amounts actually lost.113 Thus, the phrase "actual damages
sustained" suggests that if a direct purchaser passed on any part of the
illegal overcharge to an indirect purchaser, the direct purchaser should
not be able to recover the full amount of damages provided for under
Hanover Shoe.
If, as suggested above, a direct purchaser is likely to pass on at least
some of the overcharged price and the direct purchaser could only re-
cover the damages it sustained, it follows that there would be some mone-
tary amounts left unrecovered." 4 Therefore, it seems that the Texas
judiciary has good reason and support to disregard the holdings in Hano-
ver Shoe and Illinois Brick. Whereas the Texas Act disallows a direct
purchaser to recover all of the damages sustained by a defendant's misbe-
havior, there are still unpaid damages available for an indirect purchaser
to collect as "actual damages sustained."
D. PROPOSALS TO REPEAL ILLiNOIS BRICK: TEXAS SENATE BILL 881
In 1993 the Texas Senate was presented with a proposed amendment to
section 15.21 of the Texas Antitrust Act." 5 This proposal was an "Illinois
Brick repealer," but it had very conservative provisions. 1 6 First, the Sen-
ate bill only proposed a parens patriae cause of action, thus disallowing a
private citizen from bringing the suit.1 7 Second, the bill would have al-
lowed an antitrust defendant to use a complete or partial pass-on defense,
in direct contravention to Hanover Shoe, to provide for equal treatment
of plaintiffs and defendants."18 Finally, the proposed legislation specifi-
cally required strict adherence to applicable procedural devices, such as
consolidation and transfer mechanisms, to resolve issues of multiple
liability. 119
112. See Brown v. American Transfer and Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1980)
(interpreting the meaning of "actual damages" to be those damages recoverable at com-
mon law since the DTPA did not define the phrase).
113. Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. 1935); see Stewart Title Guar.
Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1991) (applying the one satisfaction rule to private
remedies in the Texas Insurance Code Article 21.21).
114. See supra part IV.C. This point highlights the inherent unfairness in the current
enforcement scheme. Since the direct purchaser should theoretically be allowed to recover
only the damages that it suffers (i.e., the amount not passed on), the indirect purchaser
should be able to recover the remaining amount. Instead, the current scheme allows the
direct purchaser to recover the entire amount, regardless of passed-on costs.
115. Tex. S.B. 881, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
116. Compare this proposal to California's Brick repealer which allows private citizen
suits (in addition to a parens patriae suit); provides for recovery of treble damages, interest
on actual damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees; contains nothing precluding
or limiting multiple liability; and has no provision for consolidation of direct and indirect
purchaser claims. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West Supp. 1996).
117. Tex. S.B. 881 (subsection (d)(1)).
118. Id. (subsection (d)(2)).
119. Id. (subsection (d)(3)).
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Unfortunately, there were no recorded debates on the proposed
amendment, which makes it is difficult to know exactly what transpired
on the Texas Senate floor. One should not underestimate, however, the
lobbying power of the business community as it was not likely to approve
of the amendment. Regardless, the bill never passed, and Texas consum-
ers were still without an indirect purchaser action for private antitrust
enforcement.
In 1995, The Texas Supreme Court had an opportunity to remedy the
deficiencies in the Texas antitrust scheme. The case of Abbott Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Segura °20 promised to be the best chance for reform since the
failure of Senate Bill 881 two years earlier. 121 But Illinois Brick reigned
once again leaving the injured uncompensated while the defendants kept
the "fruits of their illegalities."
E. A BBOTT LABORA TORIES, IN. v. SEGURA
In 1972, the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants
and Children ("WIC program") was established to assist pregnant, post-
partum, and breast-feeding women, infants, and young children from
families without adequate income whose physical and mental health is
threatened because of malnourishment or inadequate health care.' 22
Under the WIC program, the federal government buys various food and
health care supplies directly from the manufacturers. In turn, these sup-
plies are distributed by the state to the ultimate consumers.
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, an onslaught of investigation sur-
rounded some of the companies participating in the WIC bidding process.
Allegations soon arose that three major players in the infant formula
market had committed various antitrust violations, including bid rigging
in the WIC program and price fixing throughout the traditional U.S.
markets. 123
In 1991, the State of Texas filed a parens patriae suit alleging that Ab-
bott Laboratories and Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. had engaged in illegal
price fixing and had conspired with the American Academy of Pediatrics
to limit competition in the infant-formula market. 124 Specifically, the
120. 907 S.W.2d 503 (1995).
121. This case seemed promising as there were women and children plaintiffs, deep-
pocket corporate defendants, and nationwide prosecution and settlement for these defend-
ants' price fixing actions.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1994).
123. Thomas M. Burton, Spilt Milk: Methods of Marketing Formula Land Abbott in
Hot Water, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1993, at Al. Estimates were that Abbott Laboratories,
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., and American Home Products, the three allegedly implicated,
once owned about 98% of the U.S. market that was worth about $2 billion annually. Id.
124. Ross Ramsey, Makers of Baby Formula Settle with State for $1.5 Million, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 18, 1995, at 1. Bristol-Meyers subsidiary, Evansville, makes the Enfamil
brand of infant formula and Abbott Laboratories's subsidiary, Ross Laboratories, makes
the Similac brand. State Attorney General Dan Morales estimated that the two companies
controlled about 85% of the infant formula market in Texas. Id. The American Academy
of Pediatrics ("Academy") was implicated due to the fact that pediatricians had an over-
whelming influence over parents in that the parents were likely to purchase the brands that
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State accused the companies of concerted action to raise prices of their
formulas 120% over 10 years, while the price of milk, the main ingredi-
ent, only rose 36%.125
The State, alleging that the price fixing conspiracy had damaged the
citizens of the State of Texas, sought to recover millions in actual dam-
ages, treble damages, and to enjoin the companies from continuing their
alleged price fixing behavior. Soon thereafter, a small class of plaintiffs,
individuals who had "indirectly" purchased the formula at the alleged
overcharge, intervened and plead the same factual allegations that the
State had claimed, but plead them as violations under the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).126
The small class of plaintiffs was denied a cause of action because the
court felt that the plaintiffs were trying to use the DTPA as a back door to
assert a claim against a manufacturer from whom they did not directly
purchase. 127 As a result, the Texas Supreme Court confirmed its adher-
ence to the Illinois Brick rule, reasoning that the State had no more
power than its consumers, and that the consumers in this action were in-
direct purchasers who had no antitrust standing.' 28 Since the Illinois
Brick rule does not apply to injunction suits, the State's request for in-
junctive relief was left intact.' 29
In November of 1995, Abbott Laboratories and Bristol-Meyers Squibb
Co. settled the remainder of the case by giving the State $1 million worth
of infant formula and other products and $500,000 in attorney's fees.130
were given as samples to them by their doctors. According to the lawsuit, the Academy
received millions of dollars in contributions from Abbott Laboratories and Bristol-Meyers
in return for recommendations of their formulas. Id.
125. Stuart Eskenazi, Formula Makers Supply Food in Texas After Settling Lawsuit,
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 18, 1995, at B1.
126. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63. Intervenors specifically brought their
action under § 17.50(a)(3). Segura, 907 S.W.2d at 504.
127. This was viewed by the Segura court as a clever pleading designed to circumvent
the indirect purchaser rule proffered in Illinois Brick by using the DTPA. Id. at 507 ("We
will not interpret the DTPA in a manner that rewards creative pleading at the expense of
consistent application of legal principles."). Note, however, that other state courts have
allowed indirect purchasers to sue Abbott Laboratories and Bristol-Meyers for price fixing
under both the state antitrust law and the state consumer protection law. See, e.g., Mack v.
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 103-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding en-
gagements in "unfair methods of competition by fixing prices at artificially-inflated [sic]
levels to the detriment of Florida consumers" to constitute a "violation of the Florida
DTPA"); Blake v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 03A01-9509-CV-00307, 1996 WL 134947, at *6-7(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1996) (holding that "reasonable minds cannot differ, in good
conscience, that price fixing is not an unfair practice" as contemplated by the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act).
128. Segura, 907 S.W.2d at 504. The Segura court relied heavily on Kansas v. Utilicorp
United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990), which held that attorneys general may only bring a
money damages action on behalf of consumers with the requisite antitrust injury and
standing. Since the State was not purchasing under the WIC program and the intervenors
were indirect purchasers, the State did not have the requisite antitrust injury to give them
standing in light of Illinois Brick.
129. Segura, 907 S.W.2d at 504. See Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 130. Injunctive
claims are exempt from Illinois Brick because there are no problems of computing dam-
ages in an injunction suit. Id.
130. Eskenazi, supra note 124, at B1.
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Although the settlement was made to avoid the pending injunction and
subsequent loss of profits, it was generally seen as a victory by the Attor-
ney General and the Texas Health Department. There are, however,
some real concerns with the outcome of this case.
First of all, the Attorney General's office originally estimated the law-
suit to be worth hundreds of millions to Texas consumers who bought the
formula over the alleged price fixing period of ten years. 131 Assuming
that the allegations were in fact true and that the estimated damages were
reasonably accurate, the fact that the suit settled for a very small fraction
of its estimated worth essentially allowed the defendant companies to re-
tain most of the profits from their wrongdoing while leaving the injured
parties undercompensated.
It is noteworthy that a similar case filed in Florida netted the State
Attorney General nearly $12 million from Abbott (paying $8 million) and
Bristol-Meyers (paying $4 million).132 Also of interest was a consolidated
action filed in state court in Tallahassee, which included the State of Flor-
ida as a plaintiff, that settled for an amount totaling more than $200 mil-
lion.133 Initially, this sizable Florida settlement was considered to pose a
significant financial threat to Abbott Laboratories, 34 but within weeks
this initial perception changed and the settlements were not considered
by Abbott representatives and Wall Street analysts to be a serious finan-
cial threat.135 In fact, Abbott's stock only dropped $1.00, about 3.5%, in
the week following the settlement announcements. 36
The results of these Florida actions are important for two reasons.
One, Florida law had a statute that could be read to include an indirect
purchaser cause of action. 137 Since there was no specific case law disal-
lowing such a claim, the injured parties had greater settlement leverage
and were able to recover a greater percentage of their estimated damages
under their parens patriae suit. Two, there should be less concern about
price fixing defendants being subject to multiple litigation because Ab-
bott settled nine state-court lawsuits, a Federal Trade Commission suit,
five state investigations, and one competitor suit, all of which are based
upon the same or similar allegations, for hundreds of millions of dollars
without suffering any substantial signs of economic injury or decreased
sales.138
131. Ramsey, supra note 123, at 1.
132. $8 Million Settlement Reached in Baby Formula Case, MIAMI HERALD, May 25,
1993, at 5B.
133. Id
134. Burton, supra note 122, at Al.
135. Carolyn Hirshman, Analyist: Lawsuits Won't Affect Abbott's Stock, Bus. FIRST-
COLUMBUS, June 7, 1993, at 4.
136. Id.
137. The Florida statute does not specifically provide for an indirect purchaser cause of
action, but can be read to include such an action, much more so than the Texas Act. See
supra part III.B.
138. Hirshman, supra note 134, at 4.
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The Segura court's holding is also troubling because it seems to render
the cumulative remedies provisions of the Texas Antitrust Act and the
DTPA ineffective. 139 When making statutory interpretations, we must as-
sume that the legislature acts with full knowledge of the existing laws.140
Therefore, it must be assumed that when the Texas legislature enacted
the Texas Act it knew of, and made reference to, the DTPA, which was
already in effect. "[H]ad the legislature intended to exclude DTPA cov-
erage for conduct potentially violating the state antitrust act, it would
have done so under the 'exemptions' provision of the DTPA.' 141
Although this seemed to be a valid argument, the majority in Segura did
not address it and apparently disapproved of such analysis.
Finally, the Abbott case raises a great concern as to the effectiveness of
direct purchaser enforcement of the Texas antitrust laws. 142 Assuming
again that the alleged facts are taken as true, it is interesting that not a
single direct purchaser in Texas brought suit against Abbott Laboratories
or Bristol-Meyers in light of the fact that the alleged price increases far
surpassed the cost of milk, that there was public concern with bid rigging
in the WIC program, and that California, Florida, and Alabama had set-
tled similar cases with the companies. 43 Is it not true that direct purchas-
ers are supposed to be the most efficient detectors of these type of price
fixing conspiracies? '"
These "red flags" were arguably sufficient to raise concern for any pur-
chaser of the formula, direct or indirect. Not only did the Texas direct
purchasers in this case have this "public" information pointing to anti-
trust violations, they also had direct knowledge of the increased pricing in
the infant formula market. If such blatant price fixing had really taken
place over a ten-year period, how can Texas express confidence in having
direct purchaser suits as the sole means of private antitrust enforcement
for price fixing violations?
VI. CONCLUSION
The debates surrounding antitrust policy today are far from one-sided,
and there are persuasive arguments to be made both in favor and in dis-
139. Segura, 907 S.W.2d at 514 (Gammage, J., dissenting). The cumulative remedies
provisions for the Texas Antitrust Act and the DTPA are found, respectively, at TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.02(a), 17.43.
140. Acker v. Texas Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990); Irving Fireman's
Relief and Retirement Fund v. Sears, 803 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no
writ).
141. Segura, 907 S.W.2d at 514 (Gammage, J., dissenting). The exemption provision of
the DTPA is found at TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.49.
142. Note that the Federal Trade Commission, the equivalent of a direct purchaser
under the WIC program, did go after Abbott Labatories and Bristol-Meyers, but was
largely unsuccessful because the United States Department of Agriculture "failed to act to
assure an open and honest competitive bid system." Thomas M. Burton, Federal Judge
Clears Abbott in Formula Case, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1994, at A3.
143. Juan Elizondo, Jr., Texas Settles Suit for $1 Million in Products from Formula
Firms, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 18, 1995, at 26.
144. See supra part IV.D.
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approval of allowing indirect purchaser suits. The controlling issue, how-
ever, seems to be where to place the risk of error. Does one choose to
place the burdens of such risk on big business or on consumers? Cur-
rently, federal law seems to place this risk on consumers, but the growing
trend is for the states to place the risk on big business instead.
In forming its own antitrust policies, Texas has apparently decided that
it is more favorable to protect big business than its own consumers, even
though the laws as written should be construed to provide the opposite
result. Both the Texas courts and legislature have had opportunities to
change this position, but neither has chosen to do so. As a result, the
Texas antitrust laws arguably support or condone the following: (1) it is
acceptable for manufacturers to retain a portion of their profits from ille-
gal overcharges; (2) it is appropriate to allow direct purchasers to either
not pursue antitrust violations or to receive windfall judgments; and (3)
there is little benefit in compensating injured consumers or allowing the
state attorney general to police antitrust violations.
Antitrust policy focuses on many factors driving and influencing the
economic marketplace. As a result, "[f]inding the proper balance be-
tween the efficiencies that result from scale economies on the one hand,
and our distrust of bigness and some of its anticompetitive consequences
on the other hand, is a problem that is pervasive in antitrust policy to-
day. '' 145 Thus, the difficulty of antitrust policy-making involves not only a
detailed economic analysis, but also a complex extrapolation of classroom
theories to real world markets. Unfortunately, the focus of antitrust de-
bate is often directed at solving the economic problem, thus leaving the
real problems and unfairness ignored or unresolved.
145. HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 66.
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